

Trump's Foreign Policy, Authoritarian Populism and Democracy

By
Wenlan Miao

Presented to the Graduate Faculty of
Claremont Graduate University in partial
Fulfillment of the requirements for the degree
Of Master of Arts in Politics and Government.

We certify that we have read this document
And approve it as adequate in scope and
Quality for the degree of Master of Arts.

Faculty Advisor, Jean Schroedel
Claremont Graduate University
Professor of Political Science

2020

ProQuest Number:28030787

All rights reserved

INFORMATION TO ALL USERS

The quality of this reproduction is dependent on the quality of the copy submitted.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.



ProQuest 28030787

Published by ProQuest LLC (2020). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.

All Rights Reserved.

This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.

ProQuest LLC
789 East Eisenhower Parkway
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, MI 48106 - 1346

Table of Contents

<i>Introduction</i>	1
<i>What is populism? The minimum characteristics</i>	2
<i>What is Liberal Democracy?</i>	3
<i>The Roots of American Populism and Contemporary Development</i>	4
<i>Methods</i>	8
<i>How can populism affect American Political Electoral System?</i>	9
<i>Is American Liberal democracy in danger?</i>	15
<i>Relation between domestic politics and trade policy</i>	18
<i>Trade Policy with Party Preference</i>	21
<i>The Costs of the Trade War</i>	22
<i>Data</i>	24
<i>Have counties been targeted for election?</i>	25
<i>What can we learn?</i>	27
<i>Conclusion</i>	28
<i>Bibliography</i>	28

Trump's Foreign Policy, Authoritarian Populism and Democracy

Introduction

The election of Donald Trump in US has been the most striking issue representing for populism upsurge. His winning has been labeled as “the tide of populism wiping the world democracy”, but it is unclear to put these phenomena together. Liberal democracy had been continuously threatened by authoritarian regimes over the past century, with the exception of the period from 1991–2008 when American power was largely hegemonic. Nowadays, populism emerges as one of the biggest threats to democracy. US does not have a populist party leader won the White House, but during his incumbency a lot of populist ideas have been proposed.

During Trump's Administration, Trump has a very strong tension of preventing Chinese companies and impressively from being a free rider; he launched a series of unprecedented actions to raise tariffs against China. He shows the Trumpian discourse has used foreign policy as a weapon for production of a populist electoral coalition. Until the end of 2019, the newly duties cover proximately 13% of US imports. It is true that new US tariffs had the potential to benefit some American workers, who now faced less competition with imports. But trading partners immediately responded with tariff retaliation, especially against US agricultural exports, which harmed US workers in other parts of the economy. The US agricultural sector was so hard-hit that by the summer of 2018, the Trump administration announced a \$12 billion subsidy to compensate some of the adversely affected US farmers. The November 2018 midterm election results shows that 40 seats lost by Republican candidates. Trade war is a major issue in this election and one of voter's biggest concern. Above all, this paper tries to find evidence if liberal democracy has collapse and estimates that trade war has influence on pivotal districts shift seats to Democrats. Additionally, policy should be take into consideration to prevent this possible trend.

What is populism? The minimum characteristics

The term populism has many meanings, until now no one give us a certain answer about what is populism. Cas Mudde¹ has been influential, he suggests that “populist philosophy is a loose set of ideas that share three core features: anti-establishment, authoritarianism, and nativism.”² Although the concept of populism seems ambiguous, but Mudde’s definition has been widely accepted among world scholars. “Populism is defined here as ‘a thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, the pure people and the corrupt elite, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the general will of the people.’”³ In other words, populism in sense is a form of moral politics, as the distinction between ‘the elite’ and ‘the people’ is first and foremost moral (i.e. pure vs. corrupt), not situational (e.g. positions of power), socio-cultural (e.g. ethnicity, religion), or socio-economic (e.g. class).

The recent growth of support for populist political parties – mainly on the right but some on the left – plus the emergence of leaders with authoritarian tendencies in many Western societies have attracted much interest. Many theories have been advanced and tested to try and account for these phenomena. Most popular have been two groups: one sees support for populist parties being strongest among those who have benefited least from decades of globalization, who blame their position on the liberal elites, who dominate politics and whose class has gained substantially as inequality has increased. The other suggests that populist parties – notably those with charismatic leaders – draw most heavily charismatic leaders who have negative views on changes in society,

¹ Cas Mudde is a Dutch political scientist who is an expert on political extremism and populism in Europe and the United States.

² Mudde, Cas. *Populist radical right parties in Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

³ Mudde, Cas. "The populist radical right: A pathological normalcy." *West European Politics* 33, no. 6 (2010): 1167-1186.

feeling that the world is not the one they grew up and are comfortable in, with immigrants from different cultures being perceived as a major indicator of that negative change.

In this article, I take Norris's definition as my reference. Norris focus on the second argument: Populism and authoritarian leaders have attracted most support from those who view recent societal changes – multicultural cosmopolitanism, or what the UK Prime Minister Theresa May referred to as the views of 'citizens of nowhere'. She builds on his work on the shift from a material-based to a post-material culture with its socially liberal values (which she called 'Silent Revolution'). This shift is generational, and much of the empirical testing of their ideas is based on a classification of members of contemporary societies into four generation: Interwar (1900-1945); Boomers (1946-1964); Generation X (1965-1979); and Millennials (1980-1996). She finally comes to Norris 'Minimalist' definition of populism as a form of discourse making two core claims, namely that 1)the only legitimate democratic authority flows directly from the people, and 2) establishment elite are corrupt, out of touch, and self-serving, betraying the public trust and thwarting the popular will. ⁴Thus, populism attitude or values tends towards authoritarianism.

What is Liberal Democracy?

Most use of term democracy refers to liberal democracy or constitutional democracy, a much more elaborate political system. Robert A. Dahl's concept of democracy is not only a very elaborate and demanding system of political freedoms and rights, but also sufficiently tight for undertaking empirical and comparative research. Not by coincidence, his approach is probably the one most

⁴ Norris, Pippa, and Ronald Inglehart. *Cultural backlash: Trump, Brexit, and authoritarian populism*. Page 66, Cambridge University Press, 2019.

widely accepted, particularly in terms of providing a useful definition for the analysis of democracy worldwide.⁵

We can now have a more precise characterization of liberal democracy. It is a type of political order rests on the republican principle, takes constitutional form, and incorporates the civic egalitarianism and majoritarian principles of democracy. At the same time, it accepts and enforces the liberal principle that the legitimate scope of public power is limited, which entails some constraints on or divergences from majoritarian decision making.⁶ A liberal order can use devices such as supermajority requirements or even unanimity rules to limit the majority's power, or it can deploy constitutional courts insulated from direct public pressure to police the perimeter beyond which even supermajorities may not go. In short, the core idea of liberal democracy – free to enjoy independence and privacy.

The Roots of American Populism and Contemporary Development

Populism is not new, Van Beyme⁷ suggests that this movement has historically experienced at least three successive waves.⁸ But the era during the late-twentieth century has seen a substantial resurgence in their popularity. What explains contemporary developments? Observers commonly offer historical narratives, focused upon certain events and particular circumstances, to account for the rise of individual populist parties and leaders in each case. For example, American commentators have speculated that the success of Donald Trump in the GOP primaries reflected a racist reaction to the election (and reelection) of the first African-American president to the White

⁵ Doorenspleet, Renske, and Petr Kopecký. "Against the odds: Deviant cases of democratization." *Democratization* 15, no. 4 (2008): 697-713.

⁶ Galston, William A. "The populist challenge to liberal democracy." *Journal of Democracy* 29, no. 2 (2018): 5-19.

⁷ Van Beyme is a Professor of Political Science Emeritus at the Faculty of Economic and Social Sciences of the University of Heidelberg

⁸ Von Beyme, Klaus. *Political parties in Western democracies*. Gower Publishing Company, Limited, 1985.

House.⁹ It has also been thought to rest upon the appeal of the out-spoken candidate and heated rhetoric. This rhetoric triggered by a backlash against ‘No drama Obama’s’ reserved personality, rational control, and cool style.¹⁰ It can also be regarded as the inevitable outcome of the Tea Party tilt pushing the House Republican leadership further to the right and partisan gridlock in Congress, with Trump inheriting the mantle of Sarah Palin.¹¹ Similarly, the way that Brexit catalyzed support for UKIP and populist movements elsewhere in Europe is open to nation-specific explanations, including the decision by the Conservative party leader, David Cameron, to offer a referendum on Britain’s European Union membership as a way to appease Euro-skeptics within his party, the cynical but failed strategy that Boris Johnson followed by heading the ‘Leave’ campaign in an (unsuccessful) attempt to advance his prospects for leadership of the Conservative party, the role of the tabloid headlines in stoking euro-skepticism, public miscalculations by Leave voters underestimating the impact of their actions, and the capacity of referenda to mobilize protest voting.

Nation-specific events such as these are proximate causes that help to explain why things worked out as they did within a given country-- but they do not explain why the vote for populist parties across many countries has roughly doubled in recent decades. A general theory is needed, to explain this.

American has a long tradition of populism leaders and movement emerging to bawl out the establishment and demand power for the people, but no one before Trump had achieved a hostile take-over of one of the major parties and gained the Presidency. Here are summary reasons of the rise of populism: 1) Economic inequality is greater, and lower middle-class people are dissatisfied

⁹ https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/trumps-many-bigoted-supporters/2016/04/01/1df763d6-f803-11e5-8b23-538270a1ca31_story.html

¹⁰ Chait, Jonathan. "Donald Trump hasn't killed the Tea Party. He is the Tea Party." *New York Magazine* (2016).

¹¹ Jindal, Bobby. "President Obama Created Donald Trump", *The Wall Street Journal*, Mar.2016.

with society, and their social situation. In other words, they didn't get enough benefit or satisfaction during the economic growth. 2) Immigration issue, that is to say, populism is often xenophobic. Populists either look down on foreigners or think that foreigners have disrupted their lives or even steal their jobs. 3) Another aspect of populism is argued for trade protectionism, especially foreign companies. Many American people believe that developed countries (i.e. China) take their employment opportunity. It is fair for US to add more tariffs due to the lower price of import product from i.e. China.

Except the specialties in psychological and personal characteristic, Trump is very similar to populists' behavior in history. Such as, Coughlin's enthusiastic speech, attractive personality, and good at build up reputation via main media. Furthermore, using regional language to elaborate his political attitude, and even deliberately provoke hatred against the Jews. These all remind me about trump, who is familiar with "twitter politics" and start hostility towards Muslim group based on Christianity belief. Huey Long dresses casually, disregards various etiquette, and proficient in the Bible like ordinary people. Despite knowing nothing about economics, he is skilled at all kinds of political rhetoric i.e. coaxing, threatening, inciting, trading, mocking. These characteristics are also prominent in Trump, who also has the typical characteristics of George Wallace -- aggressive, fickle, arrogant, high-profile, straightforward, willing to set up contradictions, by any kind of means to achieve his goals, and never shame of anything about one's personal preferences and vices. These are the characteristics Trump showed to public. The identity of Ross Perot's billionaire – concise language and skillful "political skills" which also remind me to think Trump's personal possessions and campaign performance. As a result, flamboyant, eclectic, good at mobilizing people's enthusiastic, and highly polarized social evaluations are the common characteristics of all populist figures.

Comparative explanations for the electoral success of populist parties can be sub-divided into three categories,¹² emphasizing: 1) the institutional rules of the game regulating the market for party competition (such as ballot access laws, effective vote thresholds, types of electoral systems, and political finance regulations);¹³ 2) the supply-side strategic appeals of party leaders and political parties as rational actors when deciding whether to emphasize either ideological or populist appeals within this institutional context;¹⁴ and/or, 3) the demand-side role of voter's attitudes, values, and opinions.

Within this last category, many scholars have sought to explain the attitudes of voters.

¹⁵Explanations for the factors driving changes in mass support for populists have commonly emphasized either 1) economic inequality and deprivation, focusing on grievances arising from structural changes transforming post-industrial economies, or 2) cultural accounts, emphasizing the role of changing cultural values.

The most widely held view of mass support for populism -- the economic changes perspective -- emphasizes the consequences for electoral behavior arising from profound changes transforming the workforce and society in post-industrial economies. In Western Countries, in the authors view, income gap and wealth inequality are greater, because of the rise of the knowledge economy, technological automation, and the collapse of manufacturing industry, global flows of labor, goods, peoples, and capital, erosion of organized labor, shrink welfare safety-nets, and neo-liberal austerity policies. According to this phenomenon, rising economic insecurity and social

¹² Norris, Pippa. *Radical right: Voters and parties in the electoral market*. Cambridge University Press, 2005.

¹³ Lijphart, Arend, and Don Aitkin. *Electoral systems and party systems: A study of twenty-seven democracies, 1945-1990*. Oxford University Press, 1994.

¹⁴ Smith, Gordon, and Michael Smart. *Politics in Western Europe: a comparative analysis*. Aldershot: Gower, 1989.

¹⁵ Akkerman, Agnes, Cas Mudde, and Andrej Zaslove. "How populist are the people? Measuring populist attitudes in voters." *Comparative political studies* 47, no. 9 (2014): 1324-1353.

deprivation among the left-behinds has fueled popular resentment of the political classes. These situations are believed to have made the less secure strata of society - low- waged unskilled workers, the long-term unemployed, household dependent on shrinking social benefits, residents of public housing, single-parent families, and poorer white populations living in inner city areas with concentrations of immigrants -- susceptible to the anti-establishment, nativist, and xenophobic scar-mongering exploited of populist movements, parties, and leaders, blaming 'Them' for stripping prosperity, job opportunities, and public services from 'US'.

Methods

This research is based on the model of Pippa Norris¹⁶ which analysis populist party in Europe. The author finds that Liberal democracies have proved resilient but fundamental freedoms are threatened by authoritarian forces, which he calls cultural backlash. To examine the cross-national evidence, Norris draws upon the pooled European Social Survey, covering the period 2002--2014. The author includes all the Independent Variables: demographic (including age, sex, education, religiosity and belonging to an ethnic minority), economic inequality and social deprivation (including the Goldthorpe class schema, experience of unemployment, living on benefits, urbanization, and subjective economic insecurity (reported difficulty of living on current household income), cultural value (including populist ideology -- immigration, global governance, trust in national governments, authoritarian values, and self-position on the left-right ideological scale).

The best model Norris's found is that a regression model enters social variables and all the five cultural value scales expected to predict voting support for populist parties, including anti-

¹⁶ Harvard University

immigrant attitudes, mistrust of global governance, mistrust of national governance, support for authoritarian values, and left-right ideological self-placement. All the cultural indicators are significantly linked with populist voting and the coefficients point in the expected direction. The fit of the model (measured by $R^2=0.58$) also improves considerably from earlier models when these variables are added, although still relatively modest, and the controls remain consistent and stable. In summary, the best model combining social controls and cultural attitudes provides a consistent and parsimonious account of populist voting in Europe.

The analysis leads us to conclude that it provides the most satisfactory and tight account. This suggests that the combination of several standard demographic and social controls (age, sex, education, religiosity and ethnic minority status) with cultural values can provide the most useful explanation for European support for populist parties. Their greatest support is concentrated among the older generation, men, the religious, the majority populations, and the less educated -- sectors generally left behind by progressive tides of cultural value change. The electoral success of these parties at the ballot box can be attributed mainly to their ideological and issue appeals to traditional values.

How can populism affect American Political Electoral System?

The cultural backlash emphasizes that populist support can be explained primarily as a social psychological phenomenon, reflecting a nostalgic reaction among older sectors of the electorate seeking a bulwark against long-term processes of value change, the 'silent revolution', which has transformed Western cultures during the late twentieth century. This account predicts that support for populism will be especially strong among those holding traditional values and retro norms, including older generation and the less-educated groups left behind by progressive cultural tides.

The cultural shift has been linked with the rise of Green parties, as well as progressive social

movements and transnational activist organizations reflecting values such as environmental protection, LGBT rights, racial and gender equality, overseas aid, and human rights. But from the start, these developments triggered negative reactions among older traditionalists who felt threatened by the erosion of the values which were once predominant. In particular, it is well-established that education, age, and gender are strong predictors of support for progressive values. Over time, therefore, the traditional values often held most strongly by the older generation, less educated sectors, and men have gradually become out of step with the changing cultures of contemporary Western societies, with this displacement generating resentment, anger, and a sense of loss.

Populist movements, leaders, and parties provide a mechanism for channeling active resistance. Hence Trump's slogan 'Make America Great Again' – and his rejection of 'political correctness' – appeals nostalgically to a mythical 'golden past', especially for older white men, when American society was less diverse, U.S. leadership was unrivalled among Western powers during the Cold War era, threats of terrorism pre-9/11 were in distant lands but not at home, and conventional gender roles for women and men reflected patrimonial power relationships within the family and workforce. This emotion is most likely to appeal to older citizens who have seen changes erode their cultural predominance and threaten their core social values, potentially provoking a response expressing anger, resentment, and political disaffection.

The US electoral system has long been unfavorable to insurgent or third parties, including populist parties. At the same time, the American system of nominations subjects the major parties to radically open internal competition through primary elections. The combined result of these electoral rules is that populists win more favorable outcomes in intraparty competition than in interparty competition. In 2016 US election, the Trump vote was correlated with area dependent

upon manufacturing sectors hit by the penetration of Chinese imports, particularly in Michigan, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, and North Carolina. Similarly, in Brexit, support for the UK to leave the EU was concentrated in northern England and the Midlands.

In recent decades, Populist parties have gained growing support among the electorates of developed countries. Based on ParlGov data, there are growing share of the vote for both rightwing and leftwing populist parties since 1970 in national and European parliamentary elections across European countries.¹⁷ This suggests that a rise occurred during the 1970s, and a surge of support during the 1980s and 1990s, before a subsequent slow down or levelling off in the last decade. The mean share of the vote for Populist Right parties rose from 6.7% in the 1960s to 13.4% in 2010s. During the same period, their average share of seats rose in parallel from 5.9% to 13.7%. The mean share of the vote for the Populist Left parties rose from 2.4% in the 1960s to 12.7% in 2010s, while their share of seats increased on average from 0.12 to 11.5% during the same decades. Gains were particularly dramatic following the fall of the Berlin Wall and the opening of party competition in Central and Eastern Europe. A little while back, the 2014 European Parliament elections also saw a surge of support for Populist parties such as France's National Front, Italy's Five Star Alliance, the Danish People's Party, the Austrian Freedom Party, the Dutch Party for Freedom, and the United Kingdom Independence Party.

The success of populists varies substantially among European societies, however, and support can prove highly volatile and erratic over time, if weakly-institutionalized parties are unable to replace a charismatic leader and if they lack a strong extra-parliamentary organizational base. Thus, in the UK, the British National Party and the National Front were both eclipsed by the UK Independence

¹⁷ Döring, Holger, and Philip Manow. "Parliaments and governments database (ParlGov): Information on parties, elections and cabinets in modern democracies." *Development version* (2016).

Party. This suggest that both supply-side factors and the institutional rules of the game are important parts of the comprehensive explanations accounting for the fortunes of specific populist parties. Because the cultural cleavage divides Populism from Cosmopolitan Liberalism, which favors the free flow of people, ideas, capital, and cultures across national borders, and pluralistic forms of governance based on respect for the protection of minority rights and checks and balances in decision-making processes.

Using mathematical axis idea, the horizontal axis is divided by economy grievance: economic left favoring -- regulated markets, state management of the economy, wealth redistribution, and public spending; the economic right favoring -- deregulation, free markets, opposing redistribution, and favoring tax cuts. The vertical axis is divided by cultural value: populists favoring -- traditional social values, opposing liberal lifestyles, promoting nationalism, favoring touch law and order, opposing multiculturalism, against immigration, the opposing rights for ethnic minorities, supporting religious principles in politics, and supporting rural interests; while the other polar is cosmopolitan liberals -- taking the opposite position of all these indices.

Populist parties in American politics are fringe players, but populist candidates have been a recurring feature of presidential nomination contests since the 1970s. Such as, California governor Jerry Brown sought the Democratic nomination in 1992 vowing to “take back America from confederacy of corruption, careerism, and campaign consulting in Washington”, based on his TV speech. Despite multiple disincentives for third parties, US electoral rules have not fully suppressed populist parties to speak in government. The difficulty of creating a third-party challenge deters populists from forming new parties, but the openness of the major parties themselves affords them a viable path to power. As such, the inclusiveness of the major parties

blurs boundaries between mainstream and populist politics. In the United States, populist appeals are part of mainstream party politics.

Based on cultural backlash theory, researchers can conclude that “members of once culturally predominant groups in America may react angrily against the loss of their former privilege and status, blaming liberal elites and outgroups for these development.”¹⁸ From this prospective, Trump’s election can be explained as a social psychological phenomenon, reflecting a nostalgic reaction among social conservatives and older sectors of the electorate seeking a bulwark against long-term processes of value change the ‘silent revolution’ that transformed American cultural during the second half of the 20th century. Here comes to my question, if cultural backlash theory can be held in America, it can be argued that the strongest supports for Trump’s winning are the elder generation, men, those lacking college educations, and among those holding authoritarian values and socially conservative. Below shows the Logit regression result of the best model which can be predicted the EU populism election.

¹⁸ Norris, Pippa, and Ronald Inglehart. *Cultural backlash: Trump, Brexit, and authoritarian populism*. Page 353. Cambridge University Press, 2019.

Table.1 Predicting Trump's winning in 2016 ¹⁹

		Coefficient	StandardError	Significance	
Generation	Interwar (1900-1945)	0.00	--	--	
	Baby boomer (1946-1964)	0.36	0.18	N/s	
	Generation X(1965-1979)	0.05	0.21	*	
	Millennial (1980-1996)	-0.79	0.21	**	
Social	Black	0.00	--	--	
	White	3.06	0.23	***	
	Hispanic	1.25	0.29	***	
	Gender(male1)	0.41	0.12	***	
	Education(1-high school,4- master)	-0.05	0.15	N/s	
	Have children under 18	0.12	0.00	N/s	
	Married(yes-1)	0.17	0.01	N/s	
	Authoritarian value scale (yes-1)	0.11	0.01	***	
	Cultural	Anti-Politian scale(yes-1)	0.00	0.01	N/s
		Moral conservative	0.06	0.01	***
Religion importance(yes-1)		0.73	0.14	***	
Constant		-2.67			

First of all, the result shows a large generation gap – that Millennials being least likely to support Trump while the elder people are more willing to do. Second, it is obverse to see that people especially male who is white with lower education or for those who married with little children at home are more likely to support Trump. Third, as the hypothesis, authoritarianism, Vox Pop

¹⁹ Dataset from Gallup US election in 2016 & American National Election Study (ANES) 2016

Moral_conservative scale 1—5 (sum by factors: imgrant_atti, ethnic_min, christ_val, abortion, homosexuality)
 imgrant_atti: do you support immigrant policy scale 1(support) or 0 (not support)/ ethnic_min: do you oppose rights of minority scale 1(oppose) or 0 (not oppose) /abortion: do you oppose abortion scale 1(oppose) or 0 (not oppose) / homosexuality: do you oppose abortion scale 1(oppose) or 0 (not oppose) / Christ_val: do you support christen value scale 1(support) or 0(not support)

component of populism and moral conservative are statistically significant. This result shows that Trump's support is highly associated with cultural factors. But some will say it is likely for the unemployed people or low-income families to support Trump, the kitchen-sink model shows (which is not on table1) a negative effect and with no significance in the regression model. Interestingly, when including both economic and cultural variables in the model, cultural factors still shows statistically significant; by contrast, economic factors are not doing well for prediction. As a result, age, education, urbanization and cultural values (esp. moral conservatives and drive by authoritarian values) predicts support for authoritarian populism in America.

Is American Liberal democracy in danger?

From my perspective, Trump violated the norms of liberal democracy in numerous ways. He launched his campaign in June 2015 with a speech labeling Mexican immigrants are rapists and criminals. He called for a “total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States.”²⁰ Repeatedly at campaign rallies, “he expressed nostalgia for a time when extralegal violence could be deployed against protestors”.²¹ Due to the result of 2016 election, scholars have been considering the possibilities for authoritarian populism may erode liberal democracy in America. In the book, *How Democratic Die* (2018), the authors give a scenario by which an authoritarian leader, standing at the helm of a party that control both congress and supreme court; politicized election administration and law enforcement to entrench permanent control of the federal government.

²⁰Jenna Johns, “Trump calls for total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States”, Washington Post, December 2015, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2015/12/07/donald-trump-calls-for-total-and-complete-shutdown-of-muslims-entering-the-united-states/>

²¹ Brent Kendall, “Trump says Judge's Mexican heritage presents absolute conflict”, Wall Street Journal, June 2015. <https://www.wsj.com/articles/donald-trump-keeps-up-attacks-on-judge-gonzalo-curiel-1464911442>

Not all populism is bad, there still some good populism conditions. So before giving a concrete conclusion, it is better to distinguish good or bad populism. There might be certain forms to be good populism. Here just a summarized condition from Steven Levitsky a professor at Harvard: 1) conditions of rising and extreme inequality are actually, objectively, privileged elite against the bulk of the population. 2) the established political institutions are no longer working to address this and other pressing policy challenges. 3) grassroots mobilization for social, economic, and political reform proceeds in a democratic spirit, which values pluralism, opposition and the underlying norms of democratic life. 4) the leaders of popular reform organizations or movements model democratic behavior and understand the ultimate need ultimately to work through and not over or around democratic institutions to achieve change. Above all, what can be label as “good” populism is not authoritarian populism, but a kind of populism combined with some element of pluralism and pragmatism.

Then we will think, what make populism as “bad” or threat to liberal democracy. First, hegemonic. Populism becomes a danger to democracy when it rejects democratic pluralism and posits that its leader and party are the only true, legitimate expression of the popular will. Second, nativist or exclusivism. Populism is at risk of mutating into an illiberal threat to democracy because it targets a certain social group -- immigrants. While these targeted immigrant groups are typically not citizens, it is not difficult to concern them as citizenship. There will be a narrative that at least borders on racism and applies as well to people of the targeted groups of national origin who have in fact become citizens or are even native born. Third, illiberal. If populism is trying to restrict the rights of political, ethnic or other minority, it becomes dangerous for liberal democracy. In short, Populism does present dilemmas for democracy, but the more comprehensive, extreme and uncompromising the version of populism, the more it is likely to represent a threat to democracy.

According to the 2016 election Voter Study²² shows that 78% Americans believe that democracy is preferable to any other form of government, while 83% think it is very important to live in a democratic system. Openness to undemocratic alternatives was most pronounced among voters who combine economic liberalism and cultural conservatism—the policy profile most characteristic of U.S. populists. It was also evident among voters who favor one primary culture over cultural diversity, believe that European heritage is important to be an American, and harbor highly negative views of Muslims. Nearly half the voters who supported Barack Obama in 2012 but switched to Donald Trump in 2016 favored a strong, unencumbered leader and declined to endorse democracy as the best form of government.²³ In the final five years of the twentieth century, solid majorities of Americans were positive about the direction of the country. But since 2004, despite multiple changes in party control of Congress and the White House, majorities have been consistently negative.²⁴ The election of Donald Trump has not disrupted these trends.

Scholars generally view the rise of populist parties and leaders as a “peril” or “challenge”²⁵, because populism “always stands in tension with democracy”.²⁶ Although populist leaders claim the mantle of popular sovereignty, once in power they tend to degrade democracy by weakening civil liberties, the rule of law, and the fairness of electoral processes. In cross-national studies, populists of the left, right, and center in power are all on average equally associated with declines in free and fair election, civil liberties, and constraints on executives finds that left-leaning populist

²² <https://www.voterstudygroup.org/publication/political-divisions-in-2016-and-beyond>

²³ Drutman, Lee, Larry Diamond, and Joe Goldman. "Follow the Leader: Exploring American Support for Democracy and Authoritarianism." *Democracy Fund Voter Study Group*. Retrieved September 20 (2018): 2018.

²⁴ Müller, Jan-Werner. *What is populism?*. Penguin UK, 2017.

²⁵ Moffitt, Benjamin. *The global rise of populism: Performance, political style, and representation*. Stanford University Press, 2016.

²⁶ Mény, Yves, and Yves Surel. "The constitutive ambiguity of populism." In *Democracies and the populist challenge*, pp. 1-21. Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2002.

government tend to exercise an even more negative effect on press freedom.²⁷ Although populism's adverse consequences for liberal democracy are well documented in the comparative literature, scholars have generally not considered it a threat to US democratic institutions. Rather than a danger to democratic institutions, populism in the United States is instead seen as a rhetorical tradition operating within the confines of normal partisan or presidential politics.²⁸

Relation between domestic politics and trade policy

Economists have study political economy underlying trade disputes for a long time. Most literatures are based on single nation's view: how to predict foreign trade policy in the given position in international system. (Haas 2007).²⁹ This approach is less helpful since it seems to suggest that unanimous support for policy should be evident if all people in the country share the country's same global position. The others studies focus on the executive branch and on the preferences and beliefs of the executive (prime minister or president and cabinet) (Howell and Pevehouse 2007)³⁰. A few scholars pay more attention to domestic economic and social factors; for instance, those that explore trade policy emphasize often the economic characteristics of political actors' constituencies (Ladewig 2006)³¹.

Grossman and Helpman (1994,1995)³² emphasizes that there's a relation between domestic politics and special interest groups on certain trade policy. Developing this finding, Maggi and Rodriguez-

²⁷ Hawkins, Kirk A., and Venezuela's S. Chavismo. *Populism in Comparative Perspective*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010.

²⁸ Bimes, Terri, and Quinn Mulroy. "The rise and decline of presidential populism." *Studies in American Political Development* 18, no. 2 (2004): 136-159.

²⁹ Morawetz, U. B., Wongprawmas, R., & Haas, R. (2007). Potential income gains for rural households in North Eastern Thailand through trade with organic products (No. 690-2016-47351, pp. 111-125).

³⁰ Howell, W. G., & Pevehouse, J. C. (2007). When Congress Stops Wars-Partisan Politics and Presidential Power. *Foreign Aff.*, 86, 95.

³¹ Ladewig, J. W. (2006). Domestic influences on international trade policy: factor mobility in the United States, 1963 to 1992. *International Organization*, 60(1), 69-103.

³² Grossman, G. M., & Helpman, E. (1995). Trade wars and trade talks. *Journal of political Economy*, 103(4), 675-708.

Clare (1998)³³ argue that trade agreements could work as a commitment device for politicians against domestic interests. Based on these findings, Gould and Woodbridge (1998)³⁴ and Ossa (2014)³⁵ develop a trade disputes model between nations.

Then research on whether voters hold politicians accountable for trade policy offers mixed results. Some studies have demonstrated a lack of a relationship between individual support for special trade policies and how such policies would affect these individuals' personal in Trade policy based on party preference come (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006, Mansfield and Mutz 2009, Fordham and Kleinberg 2012)³⁶. Some interpret these findings as more evidence of the well-known public disinterest when it comes to foreign policy issues (Lavine et al., 1996; Rosenau, 1961; Williams, Brule and Koch, 2010)³⁷. Others argue that the seeming public's apathy on trade issues is a relatively recent phenomenon, resulting from the post-World War II fractionalization of US protectionist interests in response to the shift from manufacturing to service jobs, growing orientation towards imports, and the weakening of labor unions (Hiscox, 2002)³⁸. As a result of these structural changes in the US economy, a host of other political issues with larger and less splintered support bases simply overshadowed trade policy. These gives an opportunity to politicians and economic elites to take advantage of the resulting lack of accountability and shape more liberal trade policies than would be supported by the general public (Guisinger, 2017)³⁹. From the other perspective -- sociotropic explanation, posits that average voters are generally

³³ Clare, T. J. (1998). U.S. Patent No. 5,745,036. Washington, DC: U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.

³⁴ Gould, D. M., & Woodbridge, G. L. (1998). The political economy of retaliation, liberalization and trade wars. *European Journal of Political Economy*, 14(1), 115-137.

³⁵ Ossa, R. (2014). Trade wars and trade talks with data. *American Economic Review*, 104(12), 4104-46.

³⁶ Fordham, B. O., & Kleinberg, K. B. (2012). How can economic interests influence support for free trade?. *International Organization*, 66(2), 311-328.

³⁷ Williams, L. K., Brule, D. J., & Koch, M. (2010). War voting: Interstate disputes, the economy, and electoral outcomes. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 27(5), 442-460.

³⁸ Hiscox, M. J. (2002). *International trade and political conflict: commerce, coalitions, and mobility*. Princeton University Press.

³⁹ Guisinger, A. (2017). *American opinion on trade: Preferences without politics*. Oxford University Press.

unable to correctly infer the consequences of specific trade policies on their individual income (Kono, 2006; Rho and Tomz, 2017)⁴⁰, and instead rely on easy-to-access information about the state of the local and national economy from the media, elite discourse, or organizations like the AARP (DiGiuseppe and Kleinberg, 2018; Mansfield and Mutz, 2009)⁴¹.

In the United States, the economic costs of free trade have been found related to electoral penalties for the incumbents in two ways. “First, locales that are most disadvantaged by free trade may increase support for Democratic political candidates that favor worker compensation and other redistributive policies” (Che et al., 2016)⁴². Second, the backlash to free trade may lead to the rise of economic nationalism: a protectionist sentiment that attributes domestic economic misfortunes to the influence of out-groups (e.g., foreigners). Following the idea some literatures find evidences for both types of electoral related to economic shocks: Autor et al. (2017)⁴³ finds that voters in ethnically diverse districts respond to economic shocks by supporting politicians that advocate for worker compensation policies, while districts with majority non-Hispanic white populations react by increasing support for right-wing candidates with protectionist views. Margalit (2011)⁴⁴ points that, although higher unemployment rate generally results in anti-incumbent effect in the polls, this effect doubles in size when the unemployment rate is due to offshoring as opposed to other domestic factors, for example domestic competition. (also see Jensen, Quinn and Weymouth, 2017; Kleinberg and Fordham, 2013).

⁴⁰ Rho, S., & Tomz, M. (2017). Why don't trade preferences reflect economic self-interest?. *International Organization*, 71(S1), S85-S108.

⁴¹ Chyzh, O., & Urbatsch, R. B. (2019). Bean Counters: The Effect of Soy Tariffs on Change in Republican Vote Share Between the 2016 and 2018 Elections.

⁴² Che, Y., Lu, Y., Pierce, J. R., Schott, P. K., & Tao, Z. (2016). Does trade liberalization with China influence US elections? (No. w22178). National Bureau of Economic Research.

⁴³ Autor, D., Dorn, D., Hanson, G., & Majlesi, K. (2017). A note on the effect of rising trade exposure on the 2016 presidential election. Appendix to “Importing Political Polarization.

⁴⁴ Margalit, Y. (2011). Costly jobs: Trade-related layoffs, government compensation, and voting in US elections. *American Political Science Review*, 105(1), 166-188.

Trade Policy with Party Preference

The most important milestone in political economy: Downs (1957)⁴⁵ shows that in two-party system, parties interested only in winning the office not compete over policy with each other. Parties should instead converge on their policy which are favored by the median voter. If one follows Downs idea, parties will never compete on trade policy or any kinds of policy, instead party will converge their policy to median voter's preference. But hold on that thought, Downs' assumption of economic political society is that: only two parties run for incumbent, all agents have complete information and both parties most care about winning election not for public interests or goods. We could conclude partisan competition as opposed to convergence should not exists. From the respect of trade policy, Rogowski (1987) argues that Proportional Representation system (with parliamentary government and numerous parties) should foster centrist tendencies inducing support of free trade polices among parties. While in his later work, Rogowski opposed his idea that "majoritarian system seems more likely to be associated with centrist pressures among the parties in favor of freer trader and lower prices associated with it (Rogowski 2002). Later scholars have found evidence that political parties play distinct roles on trade policy and they used the tools to influence election. Milner and Rosendorff (2004)⁴⁶ finds that leaders in democracies have a greater incentive to pursue free international trade. Recently they conclude that historical class cleavages have strong influence on parties' trade policy preferences. Furthermore, the partisan identity of a party has a consistent impact on the choices of the electoral manifesto positions that it adopts on trade policy. Che et al (2017) suggest that the election of Donald Trump, on a nativist America Frist platform, was significantly shaped by votes coming from areas that

⁴⁵ Downs, A. (1957). An economic theory of democracy.

⁴⁶ Milner, H. V., Rosendorff, B. P., & Mansfield, E. (2004). International trade and domestic politics: the domestic sources of international trade agreements and institutions. Available at SSRN 1007296.

suffered most strongly from import competition with low income country, especially China. Colantone and Stanig (2018)⁴⁷ argues that in the context of US, UK where areas most exposed to import competition are significantly more likely to become politically more extreme or polarized in elections. Following all these related literatures, this paper is going to measure to what extent party polarization on trade policy could influence Republican's election.

The Costs of the Trade War


Trade benefits consumers with lower prices and increased variety, while trade war will impose hardship on US consumers with higher prices and a reduction of variety. Furthermore, China is one of the biggest importing state. Retaliatory Chinese tariffs on US exports directly affect labor income and production opportunities, especially the farmers or workers engaged in agriculture and manufacturing production that China targeted with the tariffs. Fajgelbaum et al (2019)⁴⁸ published an article points that: US tariffs protected politically competitive counties, whereas retaliations targeted heavily Republican counties and Republican counties are most negatively impacted by the trade war. Blanchard et al. (2019)⁴⁹ have focuses on the local labor market channel and finds that Trump's trade war may have been a significant contributor to the Republican Party's week showing in the 2018 House elections. Republican support declined in areas most exposed to the retaliatory tariffs, and this was only partially offset by the summer 2018 agricultural subsidies. At the same time, there were no discernible GOP gains from the new protection afforded by Trump's own tariffs.

⁴⁷ Colantone, I., & Stanig, P. (2018). The trade origins of economic nationalism: Import competition and voting behavior in Western Europe. *American Journal of Political Science*, 62(4), 936-953.

⁴⁸ Fajgelbaum, P. D., Goldberg, P. K., Kennedy, P. J., & Khandelwal, A. K. (2020). The return to protectionism. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 135(1), 1-55.

⁴⁹ Bernard, A. B., Blanchard, E. J., Van Beveren, I., & Vandenbussche, H. (2019). Carry-along trade. *The Review of Economic Studies*, 86(2), 526-563.


Graph1 (left denotes as 1A, right denotes as 1B)



(sources from The New York Times <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/10/03/business/economy/china-tariff-retaliation.html>)

Graph 1A shows nearly overall U.S. has been threatened by tariffs especially the middle area and north area. Comparing with Graph 1A, Graph 1B shows where voters support Trump most and looks similar to 1A. Generally, researchers could say that there is a positive relationship between tariffs on the change in Republican vote share, but the coefficient is small or statistically significant.

Graph 2 Tariffs shock GIS and agricultural subsidies GIS



(Sources from Blanchard et al(2019) <https://voxeu.org/article/trump-s-trade-war-cost-republicans-congressional-seats-2018-midterm-elections>)

Figure 1 shows detailed data with county level, data concludes three sets of policies related to the trade war: Trump’s tariffs, retaliatory tariff imposed by major trading partners, and Trump’s summer 2018 farmer subsidies. Graphs show that trump’s tariffs appear to have had little influence on Republican voting outcomes in 2018 midterm election. Republican candidates lost vote share in counties where employment was concentrated in products affected by retaliatory tariffs. A negative correlation might exist; more importantly it mattered most for swing counties where the election outcome is similar to 2016 election. As for agriculture subsidies, Market Facilitation Program, which designed to benefit those farmers who lost money resulted by tariffs, alleviates effect to Republican support. Consequently, this effect is small.


Data

The voting data is collected from Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections via college patrol in the level of counties.⁵⁰ It contains 2016 elections; construct the county level vote share by Republican candidates. Approval rate data comes from Gallup. Tariff Shock Data is from open source in Brookings analysis of data from Census in county level as well.

⁵⁰ Access from Claremont Colleges library.

Have counties been targeted for election?

“The Brookings researchers estimated that 13 percent of export dependent jobs in rural America were affected by the tariffs.” Researchers could see from graph 3, with stronger support Trump’s counties, the higher exposure to export dependent jobs. It might be the descriptive evidence that products produced in stronger Republican area are more likely to be targeted.



(Source from The New York Times)

In order to measure how retaliatory tariffs targeted Republican counties in US, the method is using linear regression model with following equation:

$$Y = \alpha + \beta * \text{Targeted by Tariffs} + \text{error}$$

In this equation, Y denotes dependent variable, which is the general presidential vote share for Republican party on county level in 2016 election (GOP vote share). Alpha is constant value for

this equation, that is to say that minimum consistently support for Republican. Targeted by tariffs (variable of interest) is exposure to retaliatory tariff with China in county level which is continuous variable. This equation holds other factor constant and Standard error clustered at the county level. The result for this equation should presents with one-unit change in continuous exposure with tariff, there is 3.47 unit of increase in GOP vote share change. alpha is statistically significant, which means correlation is stable. In conclusion, more exposure to tariffs with China, the more support from voters to Republican in county level based on 2016 election. Researchers indicate that targeted counties exist and statistically more likely to vote for Republican candidates in 2016 election. It also shows that political motivation has significant effect on economic foreign policy, especially designing retaliation policies. But this finding only be proved in 2016 election, some scholars argued swing back might happened.

Did retaliation tariffs influence the 2018 Midterm election? The 2018 presidential results is keeping Trump incumbent, so independent variable uses presidential approval rated from Gallup survey data instead of vote share (GOP). The same regression model applied in this 2018 dataset. The dependent variable y is dummy variable for survey question (“Do you approve or disapprove of the way Donald Trump is handling his job as president?”) from Gallup approved “1” disapprove”0”. Beta is new coefficient of interest, which capture the change of approval in 2018. The beta coefficient is negative, which indicates that counties with most effect of tariffs result in lower support for republican. However the results not statistically significant due to lack of data and late launch of tariff on China. In conclusion, counties with greater exposure to tariff are associated with a decline support for Republican candidate, but the correlation is not robust and significant for election prediction.

What can we learn?

Despite Trump's populism value is no danger for democracy, it is necessary to think what could be done to resist this trend. Dating back populist in Europe, European democrats tried to conduct alternative economic and social policies to stop the rise of populism but failed. In other perspective, we conclude that only economic policy that promotes better life, lower unemployment rate and GDP growth can stop the trend. To prevent history from repeating, US politician should take populism into international perspective and act against it. Researchers can conduct a structure with a new anti-austerity coalition based on Keynesian policies of economic stimulus. As recent decades have shown, no mechanism automatically translates economic growth into broadly shared prosperity. Allowing the well-off strata of society to commandeer the lion's share of gains is a formula for endless conflict. So is allowing the concentration of economic growth and dynamism in fewer and fewer places.

Undermine the independence of the media, Trump's twitter politics plays an important role by denouncing them as partisan, mobilizing the intense populist following against independent, professional news media, then bringing to bear tax and regulatory pressure, discouraging advertising, and then finally, after independent media are severely weakened, taking over ownership of them through politically loyal businesses and party linked political cronies. Trump's discourse also showed antagonistic between Americanism and globalism. The present digital world is a quasi-socialist world and has many characteristics that could destroy both democracy and economy in the long run. It is necessary to keep an eye on it.

Conclusion

Trump used foreign policy as a platform to establish his globalist and a thin populist ideology. Although America has a strong democratic institution based on a system of check and balances, it is important to consider its vulnerabilities. Supreme among those vulnerabilities is reliance on the person qualities of the man or woman who wields the awesome powers of the presidency. Liberal democracy is not self-sustaining. It is a human achievement, not a historical inevitability. Like every human creation, it can be weakened from within when those who support it do not rally to its cause. Despite some troubling signs, lots of researchers worries the democracy situation of US, and support for the key institutions that protect the country from tyranny remains strong.

Bibliography

Autor, D., Dorn, D., Hanson, G., & Majlesi, K. (2017). A note on the effect of rising trade exposure on the 2016 presidential election. Appendix to "Importing Political Polarization.

Bimes, Terri, and Quinn Mulroy. "The rise and decline of presidential populism." *Studies in American Political Development* 18, no. 2 (2004): 136-159.

Bernard, A. B., Blanchard, E. J., Van Beveren, I., & Vandenbussche, H. (2019). Carry-along trade. *The Review of Economic Studies*, 86(2), 526-563.

Brent Kendall, "Trump says Judge's Mexican heritage presents absolute conflict", Wall Street Journal, June 2015

Chait, Jonathan. "Donald Trump hasn't killed the Tea Party. He is the Tea Party." New York Magazine (2016).

Che, Y., Lu, Y., Pierce, J. R., Schott, P. K., & Tao, Z. (2016). Does trade liberalization with China influence US elections? (No. w22178). National Bureau of Economic Research.

Chyzh, O., & Urbatsch, R. B. (2019). Bean Counters: The Effect of Soy Tariffs on Change in Republican Vote Share Between the 2016 and 2018 Elections.

Clare, T. J. (1998). U.S. Patent No. 5,745,036. Washington, DC: U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.

Colantone, I., & Stanig, P. (2018). The trade origins of economic nationalism: Import competition and voting behavior in Western Europe. *American Journal of Political Science*, 62(4), 936-953.

Doorenspleet, Renske, and Petr Kopecký. "Against the odds: Deviant cases of democratization." *Democratization* 15, no. 4 (2008): 697-713.

Downs, A. (1957). *An economic theory of democracy*.

Drutman, Lee, Larry Diamond, and Joe Goldman. "Follow the Leader: Exploring American Support for Democracy and Authoritarianism." Democracy Fund Voter Study Group. Retrieved September 20 (2018): 2018.

Fajgelbaum, P. D., Goldberg, P. K., Kennedy, P. J., & Khandelwal, A. K. (2020). The return to protectionism. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 135(1), 1-55.

Fordham, B. O., & Kleinberg, K. B. (2012). How can economic interests influence support for free trade?. *International Organization*, 66(2), 311-328.

Galston, William A. "The populist challenge to liberal democracy." *Journal of Democracy* 29, no. 2 (2018): 5-19.

Gould, D. M., & Woodbridge, G. L. (1998). The political economy of retaliation, liberalization and trade wars. *European Journal of Political Economy*, 14(1), 115-137.

Grossman, G. M., & Helpman, E. (1995). Trade wars and trade talks. *Journal of political Economy*, 103(4), 675-708.

Guisinger, A. (2017). *American opinion on trade: Preferences without politics*. Oxford University Press.

Hawkins, Kirk A., and Venezuela's Chavismo. *Populism in Comparative Perspective*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010.

Hiscox, M. J. (2002). *International trade and political conflict: commerce, coalitions, and mobility*. Princeton University Press.

Howell, W. G., & Pevehouse, J. C. (2007). When Congress Stops Wars-Partisan Politics and Presidential Power. *Foreign Aff.*, 86, 95.

Jenna Johns, "Trump calls for total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States", Washington Post, December 2015,

Jindal, Bobby. "President Obama Created Donald Trump", The Wall Street Journal, Mar.2016.

Joseph Nye, Is the populism tide threatening?

Ladewig, J. W. (2006). Domestic influences on international trade policy: factor mobility in the United States, 1963 to 1992. *International Organization*, 60(1), 69-103.

Margalit, Y. (2011). Costly jobs: Trade-related layoffs, government compensation, and voting in US elections. *American Political Science Review*, 105(1), 166-188.

Mény, Yves, and Yves Surel. "The constitutive ambiguity of populism." In *Democracies and the populist challenge*, pp. 1-21. Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2002.

Milner, H. V., Rosendorff, B. P., & Mansfield, E. (2004). International trade and domestic politics: the domestic sources of international trade agreements and institutions. Available at SSRN 1007296.

Moffitt, Benjamin. *The global rise of populism: Performance, political style, and representation*. Stanford University Press, 2016.

Morawetz, U. B., Wongprawmas, R., & Haas, R. (2007). Potential income gains for rural households in North Eastern Thailand through trade with organic products (No. 690-2016-47351, pp. 111-125).

Mudde, Cas. "The populist radical right: A pathological normalcy." *West European Politics* 33, no. 6 (2010): 1167-1186.

Mudde, Cas. *Populist radical right parties in Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

Norris, Pippa, and Ronald Inglehart. *Cultural backlash: Trump, Brexit, and authoritarian populism*. Page 66, Cambridge University Press, 2019.

Ossa, R. (2014). Trade wars and trade talks with data. *American Economic Review*, 104(12), 4104-46.

Rho, S., & Tomz, M. (2017). Why don't trade preferences reflect economic self-interest?. *International Organization*, 71(S1), S85-S108.

Von Beyme, Klaus. *Political parties in Western democracies*. Gower Publishing Company, Limited, 1985.

Williams, L. K., Brule, D. J., & Koch, M. (2010). War voting: Interstate disputes, the economy, and electoral outcomes. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 27(5), 442-460.